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BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 362(d)(2): PROTECTING
TURNKEY SALE VALUES IN LIQUIDATIONS
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a debtor voluntarily' files a petition for bankruptcy protec-
tion2 seeking liquidation3 under Title 11, Chapter 7 of the United States
Code.4 This debtor does not intend to reorganize.5 Suppose this debtor
1. A debtor may voluntarily file for protection under the Bankruptcy Code or he may be
forced into bankruptcy by creditors. Creditors who force an involuntary proceeding seek to
have the bankruptcy proceeding dismantle the debtor organization, liquidate available prop-
erty of the debtor and distribute the proceeds to creditor claims. "A voluntary case under a
chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under
such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter. The commencement of a
voluntary case under a chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter."
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Involuntary cases are provided for
in section 303 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 303.
2. Bankruptcy protection provides two havens for the debtor. First, debts are discharged
if the debtor qualifies as an individual debtor i1nder Chapter 7. If the debtor has not commit-
ted fraud on his creditors and has made good faith efforts to pay his debts, he may be dis-
charged of liability outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. Secondly, the
debtor is relieved of harassment by creditors by virtue of the provision at 11 U.S.C. section
362, which provides an automatic stay on all actions against the debtor as of the commence-
ment of the suit. Relief from this stay, provided at section 362(d), is the principal focus of this
Comment.
3. Bankruptcy generally provides a debtor with two choices. First, the debtor may
choose to liquidate the property of his estate. The debtor who liquidates simply desires to
cease doing business, sell his property, including all forms of available collateral, and pay his
debts to the extent possible. Under this option, the debtor does not seek to continue in busi-
ness. The liquidation option is contained within Chapter 7 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-
28.
The second choice available to the debtor is to reorganize his business. This option is
available to commercial enterprises through Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74. An indi-
vidual may choose to reorganize under Chapter 13 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30.
These chapters are referred to as "reorganization" chapters. Under the reorganization chap-
ters, the debtor obtains temporary relief from his creditors and submits a plan for reorganiza-
tion to the court. Such a plan specifies a proposed course of action upon which the debtor
intends to proceed to resuscitate his business, including arrangements to make payments on his
debts. Essentially, the difference between the chapters is that under a Chapter 7 liquidation,
the debtor intends to cease operation of the business entirely. Conversely, under Chapters 11
and 13, the debtor intends to continue his business and satisfy his debts according to a plan.
The ultimate goal under the reorganization chapters is to enable the debtor to return to profit-
ability.
Because Chapter 13 concerns individual non-commercial debtors, this Comment will not
address that section. This Comment will focus on Chapter 7 liquidation plans and Chapter 11
reorganization plans.
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66.
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holds no equity6 in a certain piece of collateral and this collateral fully
secures a debt to a secured creditor7 who is neither over nor under-
secured.8 Finally, suppose the "turnkey" 9 sale value of the debtor's
5. See supra note 3.
6. A discussion of "equity" will comprise a substantial portion of this Comment because
a debtor's lack of equity results in the satisfaction of one prong of the relief test of section
362(d). Debtor equity is the surplus value the debtor holds in a given piece of collateral over
and above the amount owed to a creditor. For example, if a debtor holds a piece of property
worth $100 and this same piece of property secures a debt of $75, the surplus of $25 is the
equity belonging to the debtor.
The above calculation may be complicated by the consideration of additional debts se-
cured by the same collateral. Equity may also be determined by adding together all encum-
brances on a given piece of collateral and subtracting this total from the value of the collateral.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
7. A secured creditor is one who extends value in exchange for some interest in collateral
belonging to the debtor. In some instances the creditor may actually take possession of the
collateral and hold it in trust for the debtor until the debtor repays the debt. This is a "pawn-
shop" approach. For example, in exchange for the possession of a debtor's watch, a creditor
loans ten dollars to the debtor. If the debtor fails to repay the loan (usually with interest
within a defined period), the creditor will sell the collateral. The creditor will then take for
himself the amount owed and repay any amount remaining to the debtor.
In typical business transactions the creditor takes a security interest in the collateral
rather than actual possession because of the high cost of actually taking possession of the
debtor's goods and the fact that the goods are not useful if in the hands of the creditor. If the
debtor fails to pay the debt owed, then the creditor has a right to take possession of the collat-
eral. If the creditor is a supplier of goods, in many instances the collateral may be the goods
themselves. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1985). If the creditor is a lending institution that has ex-
tended value for the purchase of a particular piece of personal property, such as machinery, the
lender may take possession of that property if the debtor defaults.
8. It is important that the secured creditor not be over-secured. If he is over-secured, the
debtor holds equity in the collateral and the conditions for relief at section 362 are not met. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A). However, if the secured creditor is substantially under-secured,
then he may not seek to foreclose on the collateral, preferring to participate in the potential
proceeds of a turnkey sale. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
9. A turnkey sale is a sale of a business or enterprise as one, complete package, rather
than selling the individual pieces, piece-by-piece. An example of the difference of likely reve-
nue outcomes might be seen in the difference between selling a contemporary and nicely outfit-
ted restaurant, maybe only suffering from terrible management, as a going business versus
taking the furniture, the fixtures and equipment of the restaurant and selling them individu-
ally, simply as used merchandise. The liquidation versus turnkey sale distinction is described
by one commentator in the following passage:
The debtor's firm may be worth more as an ongoing entity than if it is chopped up
into little bits .... If the debtor is liquidated piecemeal, much of the value of [a]
corporation may be lost. The expertise the debtor has developed in producing a par-
ticular product would disappear, as would all the information gained in research and
development and all the goodwill generated by the firm's advertising and by the serv-
ices it has provided its customers. If it goes out of business, no one may have suffi-
cient incentive to manufacture spare parts for the machines it has already made.
These machines may have their life-expectancy shortened. For all these reasons, we
may want to encourage some reorganizations (broadly defining the term to include
any effort to keep the debtor-firm substantially in one piece), The extra value that
the debtor's firm has if it is kept intact is called the excess of its "going concern
value" over its "liquidation value."
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property exceeds its "piecemeal" 10 sale value and a successful turnkey
sale cannot be effectuated without this essential piece of collateral.
A stay on all actions against the debtor is automatically imposed by
Bankruptcy Code section 362." Normally, the secured creditor1
2 will
seek relief from the automatic stay 3 provided by section 362(d) of the
D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 529 (1984).
10. Piecemeal value is the revenue obtained from selling individual pieces of collateral
individually, without their being parts of a larger whole. Selling an isolated piece of machin-
ery, and each component or asset individually, would be an example of a piecemeal sale. Con-
versely, selling machinery, tooling and inventory together as a package is an example of a
turnkey sale.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
12. The creditor seeking relief from the bankruptcy stay is necessarily a secured creditor.
Although an unsecured creditor is still an interested party in that he is the one most likely to
benefit from greater revenues derived from a turnkey or going concern sale, an unsecured
creditor has no interest in specific property of the debtor.
Two further clarifications are necessary in developing the hypothetical: (1) whether the
creditor is under-secured, over-secured, or perfectly secured and (2) whether the creditor's
interest is secured by personal or real property. The hypothetical requires that the creditor be
under-secured. This will cause the debtor to have no equity in the collateral. For example, if a
secured debt of $100,000 is secured by property worth $75,000, no matter how calculated, the
secured creditor is under-secured. This is the relationship examined in this Comment.
If the creditor were over-secured, then the debtor would have equity in the collateral. In
the above example, this would be the case if the numbers were reversed. If the debt is only
$75,000 and secured by property of $100,000, then there is a surplus or equity. This equity
would satisfy the equity prong of the test of section 362(d)(2). Consequently, the creditor
would not be entitled to relief from the stay in bankruptcy.
If the creditor were perfectly secured-where the value of the debt is equal to the value of
the security-the creditor would likely be granted relief. The creditor's perfectly secured sta-
tus may change due to waste or depreciation. Because the creditor risks becoming under-
secured, unless the creditor can be adequately protected from depreciation of the collateral,
courts will grant this type of creditor relief from the stay in bankruptcy much the same as an
under-secured creditor.
The question of whether the security takes the form of an interest in real or personal
property is not important relative to obtaining relief of the bankruptcy stay. Although the
legislative history of the Code indicates that the scope of relief provided in section 362 was
intended to respond to problems of bankruptcy filings on the eve of real property foreclosures,
many cases apply the provision to personal property cases. See infra note 47 and accompany-
ing text.
13. The automatic stay in bankruptcy and relief from the stay are governed by section 362.
These are extremely important provisions, not only for purposes of this Comment, but also in
terms of the interplay between creditors and the debtor in bankruptcy. The stay provision is
one of the principal protections provided to debtors under bankruptcy proceedings. The auto-
matic stay provided by section 362 stops all proceedings against the debtor. Every action
already in motion is stopped, and no further actions may be initiated. The stay includes all
actions by creditors to collect on outstanding debts and is "automatic" in that it automatically
comes into existence upon the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition. Section 362(a) sets out
the scope of protection which is provided the debtor. That section provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application fied under section 5(a)(3) of
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Bankruptcy Code. 14 The relief provision"5 enables a secured creditor to
be excused from the mandate of the stay and enables the secured creditor
to proceed with foreclosure 16 on the security for the debt. Section
362(d)(2) will provide relief from the automatic stay if the debtor holds
no equity in the property-value remaining over the amount of the debt
owed-and if the property is not necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion.1" When section 362(d) is applied to the facts in the hypothetical
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien
to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
14. Id. § 362(d). Subsection (d) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay... , such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or
conditioning such stay-
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property .... if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
Id.
15. Id.
16. A foreclosure occurs when a secured creditor executes his interest in the property of
the debtor. This action results in the removal of possession of the property interests of the
debtor and precipitates the subsequent sale of the property by the creditor to pay the outstand-
ing debt.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). See supra note 14 for the text of this subsection. The policy be-
hind granting relief in such a situation is that allowing the creditor to foreclose does not cause
harm to the bankrupt's estate. The purpose of a bankruptcy proceeding is to bring all of the
debtor's available assets together and to distribute them equitably-according to governing
priorities-in satisfaction of debts owed. When property is fully encumbered, there is no eq-
uity belonging to the debtor. If there is no equity belonging to the debtor, then there is no
value left to distribute to remaining creditors. If the trustee in bankruptcy, on behalf of all
creditors, were to sell the property rather than allow a sale by a foreclosing creditor, the sale
would still produce insufficient funds to pay the foreclosing secured creditor. Therefore, al-
lowing the under-secured creditor relief from the stay in bankruptcy does not harm other
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 362(d)(2)
above, relief from the stay will be obtained by the secured creditor. The
provision is satisfied because the debtor has no equity in the collateral
(the debt secured is greater than the value of the collateral) and the
debtor does not intend to reorganize.
If relief from the stay is granted and the secured creditor forecloses
on collateral essential to the turnkey sale, the enhanced value will be lost.
Presuming that piecemeal liquidation will not produce sufficient funds to
satisfy junior and unsecured creditor claims, the loss of the surplus value
is suffered by junior18 secured and unsecured creditors.19 The only hope
of junior secured creditors and unsecured creditors is the surplus value
produced by a turnkey sale after payments have been made to senior
secured creditors.
The loss of the turnkey value is an especially poor result because
junior secured creditors and unsecured creditors suffer the loss of the
turnkey sale value with little or no offsetting gain to the foreclosing credi-
tor or to anyone else. For example, suppose a senior creditor holds a
security interest in a piece of collateral representing the debtor's primary
asset to secure a debt of $50,000. The remaining creditors represent ad-
ditional debt of $75,000. If the collateral securing the senior secured
creditor is worth only $35,000 on a piecemeal basis, the senior creditor is
undersecured. Once the debtor files bankruptcy, the secured creditor be-
comes an unsecured creditor as to the amount he is undersecured.2 ° In
this case, the creditor would be unsecured in the amount of $15,000. If
the piecemeal sale of this collateral obstructs or precludes the possibility
of a turnkey sale because the particular collateral is essential to a turnkey
creditors. However, this Comment will argue that other creditors are harmed where foreclo-
sure impairs the viability of a turnkey sale.
Relief of the stay in bankruptcy where there is no harm to the debtor or remaining credi-
tors furthers creditor expectations. The creditor bargained for the security right to foreclose
should the debtor default. Presumably, this bargain was reflected in the interest rate charged
by the creditor. Without the security, the creditor may have charged a substantially higher
rate of interest for the debtor to borrow the same amount of funds. However, the possibility of
the debtor defaulting and protecting himself with an application of bankruptcy is a foreseeable
factor that the creditor may have considered when assessing the risk of extending credit.
18. Junior secured creditors are creditors whose security interests are subject to "senior
secured" creditors. The senior secured creditor is paid first, then the junior, then subsequent
junior creditors, and ultimately unsecured creditors.
19. The loss of the turnkey value is a loss to junior and unsecured creditors because these
creditors will receive payment on their claims only after senior secured creditors are fully
compensated. Therefore, the junior and unsecured creditors have a vital interest in the manner
of sale.
20. A creditor's claim is "an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest or the amount so subject to set-off is less than the amount of such allowed claim." 11
U.S.C. § 506(a).
April 1988]
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sale,21 the junior and unsecured creditors would be left in a poor posi-
tion. Assuming that the subsequent piecemeal sale of remaining property
would yield less than remaining debt, the junior and unsecured creditors
would be substantially, if not wholly, uncompensated. However, if a
turnkey sale were to generate $200,000, the secured creditor would re-
cover the full value of his debt. Additionally, junior secured and un-
secured creditors would participate in the remaining value.
This Comment proposes that when the collective value of the
debtor's property exceeds the piecemeal sale value, it makes no sense to
allow a secured creditor relief from the stay. A secured creditor should
not be granted relief from the automatic stay where such relief and subse-
quent foreclosure on the collateral by the secured creditor impairs the
viability of a turnkey sale. A reasonable period should be preserved dur-
ing which time junior and unsecured creditors could attempt and pursue
a turnkey sale.
22
21. The situation would occur where a debtor operates a business which depends on a
dominant piece of collateral in order to continue its operation. For example, such situations
would include a major printing press in the case of a print business, photographic development
equipment in the case of a photo-developer or computer equipment in the case of a data
processing organization.
22. A reasonable period might be 90 days from the date the creditor first moved for relief
under section 362(d). If a turnkey sale were not accomplished within this period, a presump-
tion could arise that the creditor should be entitled to relief from the stay. During the waiting
period, the creditor could be compensated with interest based on the piecemeal value of the
property, whether or not the turnkey sale is ultimately successful. Although the compensation
to the delayed, relief-seeking secured creditor would be a cost to remaining creditors if the
turnkey sale were not successful, fairness to the secured creditor requires that he be compen-
sated for the delay. The secured creditor would have no duty to the remaining creditors, and
preventing him relief from the stay would infringe on his pre-existing bargain with the debtor
to foreclose subject to the debtor's default. Denying the secured creditor relief from the stay in
bankruptcy under these circumstances would deprive the creditor of lost interest on the
amount recovered from a piecemeal sale, but also lost opportunity costs. For a discussion of
lost opportunity costs, see In Re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984)
(under-secured creditor who is stayed by a bankruptcy petition from repossessing its collateral
is entitled, under the concept of "adequate protection," to compensation for the delay in en-
forcing its rights against the collateral); but see United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988) (undersecured creditor held not entitled to interest on collateral
during automatic stay of lien enforcement under § 362(d)(1)).
If the property were ultimately sold as a part of a turnkey sale, then the interest paid to
the secured creditor could be based on the amount ultimately obtained by the creditor. Under
this scheme, a question arises as to how much a secured creditor is entitled to following a
successful turnkey sale. If sufficient funds were generated by the turnkey sale, the secured
creditor might argue that he should be entitled to the full amount of the debt owed. Con-
versely, since the creditor did not bargain for adequate or perfect security, full payment on the
debt owed would appear as a windfall unless the creditor could show that he anticipated a
turnkey sale, should the debtor liquidate under a bankruptcy proceeding. The secured creditor
could be paid only the amount he would have received under a piecemeal sale, plus interest on
April 1988] BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 362(d)(2)
Protecting the turnkey sale, however, will be difficult. First, the se-
cured creditor may not be motivated to participate in this process, and
section 362(d), in providing relief from the automatic stay, makes his
participation strictly voluntary. A secured creditor who stands to be-
come substantially unsecured following a piecemeal sale will presumably
willingly participate in a turnkey sale. This will be true if the turnkey
sale results in funds sufficient to satisfy the secured creditor's claim and if
the incremental difference between compensation from the turnkey sale
equals or exceeds any lost opportunity costs associated with the more
immediate compensation available through a piecemeal sale. However,
where the debt secured is equal or substantially equal to the piecemeal
sale value, the secured creditor will not benefit from the turnkey sale and
thus will not be motivated to participate.
The second problem associated with effectuating the turnkey sale is
the relief of stay provision provided in section 362(d)(2). 23 This provi-
sion does not address the issue of the potential value in a turnkey sale.
The purpose of the provision is to relieve the secured creditor from the
automatic stay. The provision does not require an examination of how
relief will affect other creditors, both secured and unsecured, other than
by requiring that the property not be necessary for an effective reorgani-
zation. As long as the debtor is liquidating, the language of the provision
does not consider the impact on the remaining creditors. This Comment
proposes that granting relief of the automatic stay should require recog-
nition of the impact this will have on the remaining creditors.
This Comment examines the ways in which a turnkey sale may be
pursued by arguments made within the current provisions of section
362(d)(2).24 The Comment then examines arguments made by secured
creditors who do not wish to participate in the turnkey sale and who
prefer immediate relief of the stay. Finally, the Comment proposes an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code which would make tactics to pursue
the turnkey sale unnecessary.
A. The Purpose and Context of Bankruptcy Law
A basic understanding of the nature of bankruptcy law is necessary
to appreciate how debtors and creditors are treated under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Bankruptcy law, as codified in the Bankruptcy Act,25 gov-
that amount, and an additional amount of the surplus generated from the turnkey sale based
on his relative position of security to the remaining creditors.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
24. Id.
25. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. (1982).
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erns debtor and creditor relations once bankruptcy proceedings have
commenced. However, the bankruptcy rules also operate on a tacit level
long before a debtor files for protection under the Bankruptcy Code or is
forced into bankruptcy by one or more creditors. Certain transactions
between creditors and debtors which transpire shortly before the bank-
ruptcy filing are affected by a debtor's subsequent bankruptcy. A pru-
dent creditor is aware of the potential ramifications of bankruptcy
proceedings.26
Once a debtor files for bankruptcy protection, all creditors of the
debtor become participants in the bankruptcy proceedings. The un-
secured creditors are especially interested in quickly obtaining payment
or obtaining security before all available assets of the debtor are gone.
Secured creditors would like to maneuver for priority, such as by last-
minute perfection of security interests. However, the automatic stay pro-
vision of section 362 forces all creditors and all parties having claims
against the debtor to follow the rules prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code.
Once a debtor files bankruptcy, the court appoints a bankruptcy
trustee.27 The purpose of the truste6 is to maximize the value of the
debtor's estate by controlling the actions of the creditors who seek satis-
faction of the debts owed to them. The trustee tries to enforce an orderly
and equitable division of the debtor's estate, or in the case of a reorgani-
zation, the trustee acts to negotiate a workable plan. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy attempts to maximize the value of the estate by aggressively
undoing transactions which are harmful to the interests of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy trustee is given considerable powers
to enforce bankruptcy principles.28
Equitable principles dominate bankruptcy proceedings. Although
bankruptcy law intervenes in the traditional, common-law relationships
of debtors and creditors, it does not interfere at the dominant expense of
either debtors or creditors.29 Rather, bankruptcy law seeks an equitable
26. Certain transactions between a creditor and the debtor may be invalidated by the
trustee in bankruptcy. The avoiding powers of the bankruptcy trustee are contained in sub-
chapters II and III of the Code. Id.
27. The duties of the trustee are defined at 11 U.S.C. § 1106.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 323.
29. A creditor who extends value to a debtor will likely do so in a secured transaction to
protect himself in the event of debtor default.
The law permits a debtor to encumber his assets in order to secure a money debt. If
the debtor has a number of creditors, the effect of securing only one, or a few, of his
obligations is to give secured creditors priority over those creditors who remain un-
secured. Should the debtor become insolvent, his secured creditors have the right to
appropriate as much of their collateral as is necessary to satisfy their claims in full
before the debtor's unsecured creditors get anything.
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distribution of debtor assets according to a schedule of priorities.3" The
equitable scheme protects the interests of all creditors, whether secured
or unsecured, while seeking to maintain their respectively bargained-for
positions.31 Although the overwhelming majority of bankruptcies occur
by the voluntary act of debtors who seek relief from the demands of their
creditors,32 many of the provisions in the Bankruptcy Code which pro-
tect the debtor from creditor actions33 are, in actuality, principles of fair-
ness which operate to benefit other creditors. 3" For example, the
automatic stay freezes the priority positions bargained for prior to a
debtor filing bankruptcy. The idea is to protect those creditors from the
zeal of other creditors who might exert pressures and receive preferential
treatment. Because bankruptcy is a proceeding to assemble the pieces of
the debtor's estate and distribute them equitably among the creditors, it
is, in a sense, entrepreneurial. Bankruptcy proceedings have as their pur-
pose to gather available resources and maximize the use of these re-
sources to satisfy specific needs. Here, the resources to be gathered are
the assets of the debtor, and the needs to be satisfied are the outstanding
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143,
1147 & n.17 (1978).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 726.
31. "One of the principal advantages of a secured transaction is the protection it provides
against the claims of competing creditors.... To a considerable extent, the value of a security
interest depends upon the degree to which it insulates the secured party from the claims of the
debtor's other creditors." Jackson and Kromnan, supra note 29, at 1143.
32. R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 20 (1985).
33. Section 547, which addresses the concept of preferences, is an example of a provision
designed for the protection of creditors. Section 547 provides that the bankruptcy trustee may
recover or invalidate certain transfers between the bankrupt debtor and a creditor, during a
defined period. The idea behind this provision is that no creditor should be preferred by the
debtor over other creditors during the prescribed period.
34. The principle that bankruptcy proceedings have as their purpose the protection of the
rights of both debtors and creditors has been described as follows:
All bankruptcy law ... no matter when or where devised and enacted, has at
least two general objects in view. It aims, first, to secure an equitable division of the
insolvent debtor's property among all his creditors, and, in the second place, to pre-
vent on the part of the insolvent debtor conduct detrimental to the interests of his
creditors. In other words, bankruptcy law seeks to protect the creditors, first, from
one another and, secondly, from their debtor. A third object, the protection of the
honest debtor from his creditors, by means of the discharge, is sought to be attained
in some of the systems of bankruptcy, but this is by no means a fundamental feature
of the law.
A special process of collective execution is devised, a process directed
against all of the property of the debtor, resorted to for the common benefit and at
the common expense of all the creditors.
Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 224-25 (1918). For a
discussion on the theme that equitable distribution in bankruptcy means respect and enforce-
ment of underlying pre-existing legal obligations, see H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
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debts owed to creditors. The purpose of bankruptcy is to maximize the
distribution of these assets according to a plan and then to terminate the
proceeding.
In bankruptcy proceedings, the process of accumulating the debtor's
assets and equitably distributing them among valid creditor claims has
few essential rules. There are rules for gathering property into the es-
tate35 and rules which prescribe the disbursement of those assets.36 The
automatic stay provision, provided by section 362, is the focus of this
Comment. The stay has two functions. First, the automatic stay halts
any activity by creditors against the debtor instituted prior to the debtor
filing for bankruptcy protection.37 The purpose of the stay is to provide
the opportunity to assess the status of the debtor, and to determine the
extent of indebtedness and the value of his property in a static context.
Congress gave the following reason for adopting the automatic stay
provision:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protec-
tions provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts,
all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan .... The
automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it,
certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies
against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would ob-
tain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment
of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an or-
derly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are
treated equally. A race of diligence 8 by creditors for the
debtor's assets prevents that.39
The second function of the automatic stay is to provide a test to
determine if a creditor ought to be entitled to relief from the stay and
hence be able to continue with his action to foreclose on the security for
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
36. See id. § 726.
37. Id. § 362(a).
38. A race of diligence refers to actions by alert creditors who, upon some notice of poten-
tial debtor default or debtor intention to file for bankruptcy protection, run to court to protect
their rights. Diligent creditors immediately make claims on the debtor's assets by filing secur-
ity agreements, obtaining judicial liens or using other court processes. The automatic stay is
designed to prevent creditors from obtaining this additional protection at the expense of other
creditors.
39. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6296-97.
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his claim. It is this second function of the automatic stay provision
which is at issue in this Comment.
B. Legislative History of Section 362(d)
The legislative history of the Code is the first place to look to sup-
port the proposition that creditors should not always obtain relief from
the automatic stay. Ideally, the legislative history would support the
proposition that relief from the stay should be denied when relief would
impair the estate of the debtor by eliminating or foreclosing the value of
the turnkey sale. Relief of the stay in such a circumstance would conflict
with the bankruptcy principle of maximizing value.
As originally proposed, the automatic stay provision of section 362
did not contain the present two-prong test now provided at subsection
(d)(2).' As originally proposed, section 362(d) contained a relief provi-
sion only "for cause":4
(d) On request of a party in interest, after notice and a hear-
ing and for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of
an interest in property of such party in interest, the court shall
grant relief from the stay.., such as by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning such stay.42
The October 1977 Senate version of section 362(d) added the lan-
guage that would ultimately become section 362(d)(2): "The court shall
grant relief from the stay if the court finds that the debtor has no equity
in the property subject to the stay and such property is not necessary to
an effective reorganization.1
4 3
40. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977).
41. The "for cause" relief provision remains a test for relief under the present Code. 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). "Under section 362(d)(1) ... the court may terminate, annul, modify, or
condition the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of a secured party." 124 CONG. REc. 11,092-93 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. S17,409
(1978). An example of an application of this subsection is where a creditor is adequately
secured, but only marginally so, and there exists a strong likelihood that the margin will erode.
A creditor may hold a factory building worth $100,000 as security for a debt of $100,000.
However, if the building is in dire need of roof repair and the debtor is not able to make such
repairs, the value of the building will decrease. The creditor will then become under-secured.
In such a situation, the court may grant relief "for cause." See 11 U.S.C. § 361. The margin
between being perfectly secured and oversecured is an equity cushion. The more minute that
cushion, the more likely cause will be found for relief.
42. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977).
43. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 354 (1977). The Senate version also contained this
comment:
[1] For the purpose of this subsection (d), property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization of the debtor if it is real property on which no business is being con-
ducted by the debtor other than the business of operating the real property and activ-
ities incidental thereto.
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Ultimately,' the present version of section 362(d)(2) was enacted as
Public Law 95-598 on November 6, 1978.4 ' According to the accompa-
nying Senate Report:
a6
Upon the court's finding that the debtor has no equity in the
property subject to the stay and that the property is not neces-
sary to an effective reorganization of the debtor, the subsection
requires the court grant relief from the stay. To aid in this de-
termination, guidelines are established where the property sub-
ject to the stay is real property.4 7
[2] Where the debtor owns two or more properties for which an established busi-
ness enterprise has been created for the purpose of managing and leasing such
properties, the court may find that one or more of such properties are essential to the
effective reorganization of such real estate management enterprise.
[3] Where a request is made to grant relief from the stay with respect to property not
necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor, and the court determines that the
debtor has equity in the property, the court shall authorize or order the sale of the
property pursuant to Section 363.
Id (emphasis, paragraph numbering and structure added).
Apparently, the intention of these paragraphs was to clarify which debtors should receive
the equitable benefits and protection provided by the stay under section 362. Congress decided
that those debtors who own property merely for investment purposes and for tax sheltering
should not receive this protection. Paragraph [1] indicates that property not protected is prop-
erty that is not essential because no business is being operated on it, other than the mere
management of the property itself.
The exception provided in paragraph [2], for the operation of two or more properties
owned as part of a property management enterprise, is a policy statement. The class of debtors
which Congress intended to benefit by the protection of the stay provision are those debtors
who are engaged in a business with that property. The stay is intended to allow them the
opportunity to reorganize their business and produce revenue needed to pay their debts. Inves-
tors in property, who do not engage in any business with that property, are not members of the
class intended to benefit from the stay. Since these investors do not use the property for
business purposes, reorganization will not produce value for creditors.
Paragraph [3] provides that if the property is not necessary to a reorganization according
to paragraphs (1) and (2), that is, if the property is not owned and operated as part of a
business, then even where the debtor holds equity in the property, the creditor should be
granted relief from the stay. This provision reiterates the policy of protecting the viability of a
debtor's business. If the business can be saved, it ought to be protected. But if the business has
no future, then mere equity in the property is not good cause to deny a creditor relief from the
stay.
44. In November and December of 1977, an intermediary form of the (d)(2) subsection
was proposed. This version did not contain the necessity for reorganization provision:
(d) On request of a party in interest, after notice and a hearing, and for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an intereest [sic] in property of such
party in interest, the court shall grant relief from the stay.., if the court finds that
the debtor has no equity in the property subject of the stay.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in the Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
56-57 (1977).
45. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
46. S. RP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, 53 (1978).
47. Id. at 53. The report continues:
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A review of the legislative history of section 362(d) implies that the
purpose of this subsection is consonant with the broad policy of bank-
ruptcy. That policy is to protect the balance of equities between debtors
and creditors while affording certain debtors the opportunity to reorgan-
ize and resurrect their businesses. Section 362(d) is illustrative of the
balance between creditor and debtor interests. Although the stay is auto-
matic upon commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, creditor relief
is provided under certain conditions.
Section 362(d)(2) provides a test for granting the creditor relief from
the stay. The first part of the test requires that the debtor have no equity
in the property.48 Subsection (d)(2)(A) satisfies the policy of protecting
the interests of both creditors and debtors. As long as the debtor does
not have equity in the property, foreclosure on this property by the credi-
tor will not cause any harm or loss to the debtor's estate. When the
debtor has no equity in property, the property holds no residual or excess
value to him over the amount secured to his creditor. Therefore, the
creditor ought to be entitled to foreclose on the collateral because the
creditor extended credit to the debtor in return for a security interest in
the property. To deprive the creditor of this interest, when it would re-
sult in no residual gain4 9 to the debtor or other creditors,"0 would be
unfair. This result is avoided under the Bankruptcy Code."1
Section 362(d)(2)(B) provides the second part of the test. The sec-
An exception to "the necessary for an effective reorganization" requirement is made
for real property on which no business is being conducted other than operating the
real property and activities incident thereto. The intent of this exception is to reach
the single-asset apartment type cases which involve primarily tax-shelter investments
and for which the bankruptcy laws have provided a too facile method to relay condi-
tions, but not the operating shopping center and hotel cases where attempts at reor-
ganization should be permitted.
Id. The subsection's focus on real property as opposed to personal property is immaterial.
Many cases discuss the use of personal property, such as automobiles or machinery. "It is true
that the legislative history uses real property as an example to show when relief from stay
might be warranted. However, the language of the statute is not so limited, and should be read
as applying to all property which is encumbered by a creditor's interest, including inventory
and accounts receivable." In re Matter of Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635, 641
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A).
49. There can be no residual gain to the debtor when he holds no equity in property. Even
assuming that the creditor did not foreclose, and the property was instead sold by the bank-
ruptcy trustee, the debtor would still not benefit from the sale. In such a case, the proceeds of
the sale would go to the creditor, and not to the debtor.
50. Creditors other than the creditor seeking relief from the stay are considered parties in
interest. Their claims will be paid, if at all, from residual revenues found in the debtor's estate
after payment of all allowed secured claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 506.
51. For a discussion of creditor-debtor bargaining, see Jackson and Kronman, supra note
29, at 1143.
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ond prong requires that the property, with regard to which a secured
creditor seeks relief of the stay, is not necessary for an effective reorgani-
zation.5 2 This subsection satisfies the policy of protecting the debtor's
opportunity to resurrect his business according to a plan. The creditor
may not obtain relief from the stay unless the debtor has no equity in the
property and the debtor does not require the property for reorganization
of his business. The purpose of this provision is to prevent creditors from
foreclosing on resources which would allow the debtor to continue oper-
ating his business. This provision furthers the broad policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Code which is to enable and encourage a debtor to reorganize,
rebuild and continue his operation in order to pay his debts. Section
362(d)(2)(B) is helpful to creditors by providing a mechanism through
which the debtor can generate some income and pay out on creditor
claims.
The test of section 362(d)(2) explicitly provides protection for the
value of a debtor's estate as a going concern by limiting relief of the stay
to situations where the property is not part of a reorganization plan.
Although the legislative history of the section does not explicitly discuss
reorganization value in terms of a turnkey liquidation, the legislative his-
tory does, however, support the theory that reorganization value ought
to be protected.
C. Structural Analysis of Section 362(d)
The question addressed in this section is whether a court must grant
a creditor relief from the stay under section 362(d) if the test under that
section is satisfied. In other words, is the creditor absolutely entitled to
relief from the bankruptcy stay when the debtor has no equity in the
property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization?
Section 362(d) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided
under subsection (a) [the automatic imposition of the stay upon
filing of bankruptcy by the debtor] of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of
an interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property
under subsection (a) of this section, if-
52. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B).
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(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such
property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization.53
The first important proposition is that paragraph (d) clearly must
modify both subsections (1) and (2). This conclusion is important be-
cause paragraph (d) provides that the court shall grant relief "such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay ... ." Even
if it is mandatory for the court to grant relief under subsection (2) when
both (A) and (B) are satisfied, the language indicates that the court is not
required to grant complete relief. In such a case, the court may also mod-
ify or condition the stay. The "terminate, annul, modify or condition"
language is apparently meant to provide judicial flexibility in granting
relief of the stay. If flexibility is intended, then this language should al-
low the court to condition relief upon a limited term during which a
turnkey sale may be pursued.54
If the court has the flexibility to modify or condition the stay as an
53. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
54. This conclusion is based not only on a common-sense reading of the provision, but also
on an analysis of the linguistic and logical structure of the language. Analyzing the statute
linguistically, the disjunctive "or" placed after subsection (1) requires that either subsection (1)
or subsection (2) applies to the active stipulation provided at (d). Both subsections must be
subject to (d). If "or" were read to separate subsection (2) from (d) then (2) would also lack
both a subject and a verb: the subject is "the court" and the verb is "shall grant relief." If (2)
were separated from (d), (2), having neither a subject nor a verb, would be nonsensical. There-
fore, subsection (2) must be modified by (d).
Stylistically, the same result is obtained. The purpose of indenting the sub-parts is to
show that they are sub-parts of a larger section. Subsections (1) and (2) are shown as equal
sub-parts of (d). If (2) were not intended as an equal sub-part, it would not be so indented and
would have been written differently with a separate modifying clause.
Diagrammatically, the entire subsection must read as follows:
IF upon a request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing
AND
IF there is "cause' including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest
OR
IF with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this
section
AND
IF the debtor does not have an equity in such property
AND
IF such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization
THEN the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such
stay.
This analysis of logical and linguistic structure is based on analytic tools presented in Benson,
Up a Statute with Gun and Camera: Isolating Linguistic and Logical Structures in the Analysis
of Legislative Language, 8 SETON HALL 279 (1984-85).
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interim measure against complete termination, then the court may deny
the creditor immediate relief of the stay. This result would enable the
pursuit of a turnkey sale. However, the legislative history of section
362(d) and its judicial interpretation render illusory the flexibility indi-
cated by the structural analysis above. Neither the legislative history nor
judicial interpretation of the section indicate that any flexibility was
intended.
The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, which accompanies
the originally proposed Code states:
Subsection (d) requires the court, on request of a party in inter-
est, to grant relief from the stay, such as by terminating, annul-
ling, modifying, or conditioning the stay, for cause. The lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property of the party re-
questing relief from the stay is one cause for relief, but is not the
only cause. As noted above, a desire to permit an action to
proceed to completion in another tribunal may provide another
cause. Other causes might include the lack of any connection
with or interference with the pending bankruptcy case. For ex-
ample, a divorce or child custody proceeding involving the
debtor may bear no relation to the bankruptcy case. In that
case, it should not be stayed. A probate proceeding in which the
debtor is the executor or administrator of another's estate usu-
ally will not be related to the bankruptcy case, and should not
be stayed. Generally, proceedings in which the debtor is a fidu-
ciary, or involving post-petition activities of the debtor, need
not be stayed because they bear no relationship to the purpose
of the automatic stay, which is debtor protection from his cred-
itors. The facts of each request will determine whether relief is
appropriate under the circumstances."
The passage apparently defines relief of the automatic stay as mean-
ing complete relief, not something less. The passage begins by stating
that the court shall grant relief, such as by terminating, annulling, modi-
fing or conditioning the stay. However, in all of the examples given, the
language simply says that the action should not be stayed. The examples
in the legislative history passage indicate complete relief of the stay. In
55. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343-44 (1977) (emphasis added). Note that
the report states nothing regarding lack of equity and necessity of property for reorganization.
As originally proposed, the Code did not contain this second test, later section 362(d)(2).
However, as discussed in supra note 54 and accompanying text, the same analysis and discus-
sion of subsection (1) applies equally to subsection (2) because both subsections are equally
subject to the stipulations in the "parent" section, namely (d).
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no example does the passage indicate that the "stay should be lifted or
modified."56
Commentary in the Congressional Record on the passage of the final
version of the Code supports the interpretation that "relief" at section
362(d)(2) means "complete relief" of the stay:
Under section 362(d)(1) ... the court may terminate, annul,
modify, or condition the automatic stay for cause, including
lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of a se-
cured party.... Under section 362(d)(2) the court may alter-
natively terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic
stay for cause including inadequate protection for the creditor.
The court shall grant relief from the stay if there is no equity
and it is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the
debtor.
57
Although this passage is unclear, since it refers to the "for cause"
relief of subsection (d)(1) as also being a component of (d)(2), the passage
does, nonetheless, indicate that the court shall grant complete, uncondi-
tional, immediate relief if there is no equity and if the property is not
necessary to an effective reorganization. Therefore, it would seem that
little direct support exists in the legislative history for conditioning imme-
diate relief of the bankruptcy stay to a creditor who satisfies section
362(d). Relief from the automatic stay is apparently available, despite
any consideration of the potential value derived from the possibility of a
turnkey sale.
D. Judicial Interpretation of Section 362(d)
The test of section 362(d) as shown above provides limited flexibility
in granting a creditor relief from the automatic stay. From the point of
view of interpreting the statutory language, the first main paragraph of
section 362(d) was shown to govern the two-part test contained in sub-
section (d)(2). A court applying the test should be able to either termi-
nate, annul, modify or condition the stay. The legislative history,
however, has not clarified or elaborated these alternatives. In fact, the
history tends to indicate that when the conditions of the test at section
56. See also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200, Nov. 28, 29 and Dec. 1, 1977, pt. 1 at 57 (1978) ("The
court shall grant relief from the stay if the court finds that the debtor has no equity in the
property subject of the stay").
57. 124 CONG. REC. 32,395-96 (1978).
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362(d) are met, complete relief from the stay is intended. The issue,
then, is how the relief provision has been interpreted judicially.
Relief from the automatic stay, as provided by section 362(d)(2), has
tended to be absolute. Where the conditions at (2)(A) and (B) are satis-
fied, the court will grant "complete" relief.
In In re Matter of Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.,58 a secured creditor
sought relief from the stay under subsection (d)(2). The court held that:
subsection (d)(2) represents the view of Congress that a creditor
is entitled to relief from stay in every case in which the two-
pronged test of this subsection is met: relief from stay should
be granted if there is no equity in the collateral, and the collat-
eral is not essential to an effective reorganization. Congress has
thereby taken away a certain amount of the discretion which
formerly rested with Bankruptcy Judges under Bankruptcy
Rule 11-44, and replaced it with its own value judgment that
such facts warrant relief from stay in every instance.59
Similarly, in In re Stewart,' the court stated that it was
compelled to grant relief from the stay.., where the debtor is
without equity in the property and the same is not necessary to
a reorganization. Thus, whatever latitude the Court might
have in assessing and dealing with 'clause' [sic] under the first
test of § 362(d), it would appear that § 362(d)(2) requires the
Court in liquidations to determine whether an equity exists in
the debtor and, if not, to grant relief.
61
These passages indicate that judicial interpretation of section 362(d)
is harmonious with the legislative history, but not with the statutory
analysis presented above. The flexibility in granting the relief of the stay
does not find judicial support. Cases exist where the equitable powers of
the court have been used to modify or condition the stay when the facts
of the case have shown cause.62 However, reliance on the equitable pow-
58. 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (secured creditor entitled to have automatic stay
lifted where debt exceeded value of collateral and encumbered property was not essential to a
reorganization plan).
59. Id. at 641 (emphasis in original).
60. 3 Bankr. 24 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (bank entitled to relief from stay where debtor
held no equity in an automobile in which bank held security interest).
61. Id. at 25. See also In re Penny, 52 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985) (property was
needed for an effective reorganization, and thus automatic stay would not be lifted, although
the debtor held no equity in property).
62. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982): "The court may issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title." This power was demonstrated in In re Francis, 42 Bankr. 760 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1984), where the debtor did not have equity in the property and the property was not necessary
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ers of the court alone, without a statutory basis, would not provide the
protection of the turnkey sale potential that this Comment advocates. A
structural basis for the protection of the turnkey sale is preferable to reli-
ance on the equitable discretion of the bankruptcy court. Preservation of
the turnkey sale opportunity requires a showing that either one of the
section 362(d)(2) prongs is not satisfied. Either-
(A) the debtor does have equity in the property; or
(B) the property is necessary for an effective reorgan-
ization.
II. SATISFYING SECTION 362(d) TO ENABLE A TURNKEY SALE
A. The Debtor has "Equity" in the Property
Assuming that reliance on the discretion of the court is not a basis
for securing the turnkey sale, the basis for the sale must be found, if at
all, in a statutory argument, made on the basis of section 362(d) itself.
One argument is that the debtor does hold "equity" in the property.
The term "equity" is neither defined by the Bankruptcy Code nor is
it discussed in the Code's legislative history.63 Thus, the only source for
interpreting this term is found in the case law. A broad construction of
"equity" is most desirable in view of the goal of the hypothetical
presented by this Comment. This interpretation would require a view of
equity which is almost abstract-abstract enough to encompass the po-
tential equity value of a turnkey sale over the value of a piecemeal sale.
A broad, expansive conception of equity will further the goal by allowing
for a reorganization. The debtor intended to liquidate the property to pay secured and un-
secured creditors. However, rather than allowing complete relief of the stay, the court condi-
tioned the stay by continuing it for five months during which time the debtor was able to
pursue a sale. If the property had not been sold within the five month period, the stay would
have been lifted, and the creditor would have been permitted to foreclose. This limited holding
is contrary to the cases noted above which held that relief must be granted if the debtor has no
equity in the property and if the debtor fails to satisfy the reorganization prong of the test at
section 362(d).
Although the court did not expressly state its reasoning in the opinion, the court may
have reasoned that the debtor would have a greater interest in deriving the highest possible
revenue for the sale of the property than would the secured creditor. The creditor, accord-
ingly, would be more likely to seek out the buyer who was willing only to pay a value equal to
the value of the debt.
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). It would be desirable for the
purposes of satisfying the equity test at section 362(d)(2)(A) if the term "debtor" could be
construed, with authority, to include all parties who have an interest in the estate. Thus,
unsecured creditors, who would benefit by the proceeds of a turnkey sale, could be said to have
an equitable interest in the property. However, no such abstract authority is available.
"Debtor" is defined in the Code to mean a "person or municipality concerning which a case
under this title has been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:893
a showing that the debtor has "equity" in the property. If the debtor
holds equity in the property, his interest will satisfy the first prong of the
test.
No direct authority exists for such a philosophical construction of
the term "equity." The court in In re Faires6 held that "equity" refers
to the "difference between the value of the property and all encum-
brances against it."65 A substantial divergence of opinion exists, how-
ever, as to whether a court should subtract the encumbrance of a single
creditor seeking relief from the value of the property to determine debtor
equity, or whether the court should add all encumbrances together and
subtract this sum from the resale value of the property."
Defining equity as the sum value of all encumbrances on the prop-
erty is a broad construction of "equity" since the interest of other credi-
tors is at least implicitly acknowledged. Courts that have so held have
not viewed the relief of stay in an isolated context, merely in terms of the
debtor and the single, particular, creditor seeking relief of the automatic
stay. Rather, they have viewed the relief provision in the total context of
the debtor relative to all creditors who have a security interest in the
collateral. If the court adds together all encumbrances on a piece of
property to determine whether the debtor holds any residual equity, then
the court ought to consider the beneficial value of the property to the
collective set of creditors. This value would be the "equity" value obtain-
able in the turnkey sale versus a piecemeal sale.
For example, suppose the debtor holds property with a piecemeal
sale value of $100,000. Suppose there are three creditors who hold secur-
ity interests in such property, creditor A having first priority, creditor B
64. 34 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (equity refers to difference between value of
property which is subject to relief of automatic stay and all encumbrances against it).
65. Id. at 552.
66. For example, suppose a given piece of property belonging to the debtor secures several
creditors, and this property has a resale value of $100,000. If the creditor seeking relief has a
claim of $90,000, and his claim alone is subtracted from the $100,000 value, the debtor will
have an equity of $10,000. Alternatively, if the same property has three encumbrances against
it, (e.g., creditor A has a secured interest of $90,000, creditor B $25,000 and creditor C
$35,000), if these three encumbrances are added together, and if the sum of these encum-
brances is subtracted from the value of the property, the debtor has no equity. A deficit of
$50,000 exists.
As described in the court's opinion in In re Koopmans, 22 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982),
[t]here is a divergence of opinion over what constitutes 'equity' within the meaning of
Section 362 (d)(2)(A). The statute refers to the equity of the debtor which suggests
the difference between the value of the property and all encumbrances against it.
This is the predominant view .... Some, however, see equity as the difference be-
tween the value of the property and the lien which is the subject of relief.
Id. at 396 n.2 (citations omitted).
April 1988] BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 362(d)(2)
having second priority and creditor C having third priority.6 7 Suppose
creditor A has a claim of $75,000, creditor B a claim of $50,000 and
creditor C a claim of $50,000. If the court adds the value of all three
encumbrances, a total of $175,000 will result. The debtor will be said to
have no equity in the property because it is worth only $100,000. If,
however, the court were to look only to the value of creditor A, the party
seeking relief, the debtor would have equity of $25,000, and hence relief
from the stay to creditor A would be denied. But by looking at the value
of all three encumbrances, if the court then grants relief, secured creditor
A will proceed with foreclosure and sale of the property. However, credi-
tor A will be interested in obtaining through this sale only enough reve-
nue to satisfy his claim. Creditor A has no motivation to sell the
collateral for any amount over the amount of his claim because any sur-
plus value would be returned to the debtor's estate for disbursement to
remaining creditors.6"
The argument could then be made that by adding the value of all
encumbrances, the benefit directly accrues to secured creditor A, who is
thus able to obtain relief that he otherwise would have been denied.
With the relief, he benefits by foreclosing and satisfying his claim. Credi-
tors B and C, whose encumbrances made the relief from the bankruptcy
stay possible, have their interests jeopardized. Neither creditor B nor C
will have any control over the sale conducted by creditor A.69 It will be
very important to creditors B and C to sell the property in the manner
generating the highest possible revenue, as it will also be to any creditors
junior10 to secured creditor C. The highest possible revenue outcome
also is a concern of all unsecured creditors, who are paid by any surplus
value remaining after payment to senior or priority creditors.
A court which adds all encumbrances together to determine debtor
67. Priority is determined on the basis of a number of factors including "attachment" and
"perfection" of liens. These mechanisms are beyond the scope of this Comment. Their techni-
cal operations are not necessary for understanding the discussion of the hypothetical and are
therefore avoided in the discussion. For an excellent discussion, see Jackson and Kronman,
supra note 29, at 1143.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
69. Creditors B and C may choose to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale and
transfer it to the debtor's estate in an attempt to preserve the turnkey sale. Since this would be
a contemporaneous transfer, they would not be subject to a preference attack under section
547 of the Code. However, expecting junior secured creditors to extend additional revenue in
the interest of preserving a turnkey sale is unrealistic. The burden on creditor B and C is
considerably more onerous than the denial of relief to creditor A for a reasonable period to
pursue a turnkey sale.
70. Junior secured creditors are those creditors who have a security interest in a given
piece of property, but who hold such interest subject to prior claims of other secured parties.
The junior secured creditor will receive payment only after the senior creditors are paid in full.
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equity implicitly addresses the interests of the "pool" of creditors. It is
arguable, therefore, that this interest of all creditors whose encumbrances
are added together in the determination of equity is an "equity" in the
property held by the debtor on behalf of the collective creditors. The
equity is the beneficial interest to the pool of creditors, which has an
interest in maximizing the revenue from the sale of the property. The
pool of creditors has an interest in pursuing the turnkey sale because it
will maximize the potential revenue of the sale of the debtor's property.
The potential value of a turnkey sale over a piecemeal sale is then an
equity value, if only a potential value. This argument, if it had support,
would successfully satisfy the first prong of the test for relief under sec-
tion 362(d). The debtor would hold equity in the property."
An alternative argument may be made in support of the finding that
the debtor has equity in the property. This argument is based on an
expansive reading of Bankruptcy Code section 541,72 which defines the
property belonging to the debtor's estate.7 3 This argument suggests that
the turnkey value of the sale of the debtor's estate is "property" which
belongs to the estate, just as other intangible properties, such as causes of
action, 4 are considered property of the estate. Section 541 provides in
part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302,
or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of
all the following property, wherever located and by whomever
held:
(1) [A]ll legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
71. The persuasive value of the argument is clearly threatened by a lack of authority.
Authority only exists for the premise that the value of all encumbrances is to be considered in
determining debtor equity in the property or collateral. Obviously, the argument fails entirely
when the court holds that equity is only the difference between the sale value of the property
and the individual encumbrance of the creditor seeking relief from the stay. See supra note 66
and accompanying text.
Many courts have recognized the value of a going concern or turnkey sale over piecemeal
liquidation. "[P]roperty standing alone may have no equity, but when sold as a package, may
bring a better price for other assets, as for example, workings for watches yet to be assembled,
or contiguous parcels of real property." Koopmans, 22 Bankr. at 407. The hypothetical pro-
posed in this Comment presumes that in no possible, non-turnkey sale could there be revenue
remaining over the amount of all claims, thus foreclosing any argument that the debtor has
equity in the property. Such a situation would focus on principles of valuation. For a discus-
sion of turnkey versus piecemeal valuation, see Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy,
32 UCLA L. Rnv. 1061 (1985).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
73. "Estate" refers to the collection of various property belonging to the debtor. Id.
74. Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984) (debtor's personal injury claim
whether unliquidated or settled is property of debtor's estate as of commencement of case).
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property as of the commencement of the case.75
Section 541(a)(6) further provides that property of the estate also in-
cludes, "[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from prop-
erty of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by
an individual debtor after the commencement of the case."
'76
The phrase "property of the estate" is intended to be construed
broadly.77
[Section] 541(a)(1) is intended to include in the estate any
property made available to the estate by other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Several of these provisions bring into the
estate property in which the debtor did not have a possessory
interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced.78
In light of section 541 and the legislative and judicial mandate that
section 541 be read broadly, it is arguable that the turnkey value locked
in the collective nature of the debtor's property is property of the estate.
The right to sell the property for its highest value is a right of the debtor
at the time of commencement of the case. Therefore, relief from the stay
via a creditor's action under section 362(d) will be a deprivation of a
property right of the debtor. The debtor can be said to have equity in the
property since this right to sell on a turnkey basis is vested in the prop-
erty itself at the commencement of the bankruptcy. This property inter-
est belongs to the debtor as a distinct interest from the security interest in
the collateral held by the creditor. In this sense, the "equity" prong is
again satisfied because this interest represents an equity in the property.
Additionally, the relief action under section 362(d) would violate the
principles of section 541. Section 541 seeks to define and maintain the
property of the debtor on behalf of the estate.7 9
The problem with the above "equity" and "property" analysis is
twofold. First, this analysis is entirely lacking in judicial authority. No
75. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
76. Id. § 541(a)(6).
77. "The scope of... paragraph [(a) of section 541] is broad. It includes all kinds of
property, including tangible or intangible property, causes of action, and all other forms of
property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5868 (citation
omitted).
78. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983) (citations omitted)
(property seized by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) immediately prior to filing of debtor's
Chapter 11 petition is property of estate, since debtor, and not IRS, retains ownership interest
in property).
79. Section 542 of the Code provides for the turnover of property removed from the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 542.
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court has so broadly construed "equity" or "property."8 Second, it has
serious impact on creditor expectations concerning rights of foreclosure.
A creditor may argue that he bargained for the right to foreclose on
property securing the debt and that he owes no duty to remaining credi-
tors, regardless of the potential value that may be generated on their be-
half by a turnkey sale. Enabling the turnkey sale on behalf of other
creditors, especially those who did not bargain for any security, is accom-
plished at the expense of the secured creditor. Denying relief of the stay
is unfair since the secured creditor bargained for a security interest in the
property. The foreclosure interest, bargained for by the secured creditor,
most likely did not include consideration for beneficial interests of other
creditors.
The secured creditor could, however, be compensated for the lost
opportunity costs associated with a delay in foreclosure.81 This Com-
ment proposes that such a delay would be short term. Perhaps a period
of ninety days would be given to pursue and effectuate a turnkey sale.
Compensating the creditor with interest on his security and lost opportu-
nity costs would be outweighed by the increase in value generated by a
turnkey sale. Junior secured creditors also bargained for rights to fore-
close on security interests. It makes little sense to impair the value of the
junior creditors' security interests by enabling the senior secured creditor
to unilaterally wipe out the potential turnkey sale value. Although the
junior secured creditors may not have relied on the turnkey sale value of
their collateral any more than the senior secured creditor, junior secured
creditors would not have expected needless destruction of their equity.
8 2
B. Satisfying Prong Two: The Property is Necessary
for an Effective Reorganization
This Comment has pursued an argument in support of a turnkey
sale under the first prong of the test at section 362(d). The focus has
80. Property has been construed abstractly and broadly in the sense that it has been held
to encompass causes of action. A cause of action is a property right of the estate and may be
pursued by the Trustee on behalf of the estate. See I1 U.S.C. § 544.
81. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
82. Consider, for example, the common-law creditor's right of marshalling:
Marshalling is an equitable doctrine developed historically and traditionally used to
prevent a junior lienholder with a security interest in a single property from being
squeezed out by a senior lienholder with a security interest not only in that property,
but in one or more additional properties. The doctrine requires the senior lienholder
to first resort to assets free of the junior lien to avoid the inequity which would other-
wise result from the unnecessary elimination of the junior lienholder's security with
the increased likelihood the junior creditor will be unable to satisfy its claim.
Shedoudy v. Beverly Surgical Supply Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 730, 733, 161 Cal. Rptr. 164, 166
(1980) (citations omitted).
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been whether the debtor has equity in the property. However, there is no
judicial authority for the broad and expansive interpretations of equity
and property. Turning to the equitable powers of the court to delay relief
from the stay is unsatisfactory since it amounts to a mere plea for the
mercy of the court. Although it might be effective, such a plea seems a
last resort and is less satisfactory than an argument based on the Bank-
ruptcy Code and judicial authority.
A method exists, however, by which the debtor can prevent a credi-
tor from obtaining relief from the automatic stay. This tactic will enable
a turnkey sale. The tactic is based upon both the language of the Code
and judicial authority. Although previous arguments have been based on
the "equity" prong of section 362,13 this argument is based on the second
prong of section 362, namely subsection 362(d)(2)(B). That subsection
asks whether the property is necessary to an effective reorganization."4 A
way exists in which the debtor can, in fact, show that the property is
necessary to an effective reorganization.
A debtor who does not desire to reorganize his business need not
necessarily file under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if the
debtor desires only to liquidate his business.8" A Chapter 7 liquidation
was used in the hypothetical introducing this Comment because it was
important to clarify or emphasize that the debtor did not intend to con-
tinue in business. In fact, the debtor himself may be largely disinterested
in a turnkey sale.8 6 However, the turnkey sale that this Comment advo-
cates is for the benefit of junior and unsecured creditors. It is not in-
tended for the benefit of the debtor himself. The turnkey liquidation is
provided by the bankruptcy reorganization provisions contained in
Chapter 11. Section 1123(b)(4) of Chapter 1187 explicitly provides:
(b) Subject to subsection (a)88 of this section, a plan may-
(4) provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the
property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of
83. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A) (1982).
84. Id. § 362(d)(2)(B).
85. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
86. Throughout this Comment, the term "debtor" has been used to designate the actor
seeking to prevent the relief and foreclosure action of the creditor. In reality, a debtor seeking
to liquidate without rehabilitating his business may not actually care a great deal about the
satisfaction of his debts to junior secured or unsecured creditors, as the debtor himself will
likely be discharged from his debts in any case. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.
87. Id. § 1123(b)(4).
88. Subsection (a) states: "Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy
law, a plan shall.. . ." Id. § 1123(a).
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such sale among holders of claims or interests[.] 9
The Chapter 11 reorganization allows the total sale of the entire
debtor estate. Liquidation, then, can be accomplished within the reor-
ganization chapter. A turnkey sale, with certain property indicated as
essential to a successful turnkey sale, will qualify as a reorganization
plan. In this way, the debtor satisfies the second-reorganization-
prong of the section 362. The property is necessary for an effective liqui-
dating reorganization, as liquidation is expressly identified as a form of
reorganization. Further, the debtor himself need not implement such a
plan. Even if the debtor were to file under Chapter 7, as in the opening
hypothetical of this Comment, the debtor's plan under Chapter 7 may be
converted to a plan under Chapter 11 by a party in interest.90
A liquidating reorganization 91 is supported by judicial authority. 92
In In re W.S. Sheppley & Company,93 the creditors moved to lift the
automatic stay imposed by the debtor, Sheppley, filing Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy.9a In this case, the debtor had not yet actually proposed a liqui-
dating reorganization plan. In fact, the debtor had not yet proffered any
plan, but only various options it was considering, including a liquidating
89. Id. § 1123(b)(4).
90. Id. Bankruptcy Code section 706(b) provides: "[o]n request of a party in interest and
after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under
chapter 11 of this title at any time." Id. § 706(b). "The decision whether to convert is left in
the sound discretion of the court, based on what will most inure to the benefit of all parties in
interest." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5880.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4). The liquidating reorganization is also expressly supported by
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). This section concerns the confirmation of the reorganization of the
plan. Subsection (a)(1 1) provides: "Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to
the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." Id.
(emphasis added).
92. In re Coastal Equities, Inc., 33 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983), concerned a debtor
who originally filed under Chapter 7 and converted to a liquidating Chapter 11 plan. Id. at
899. Creditors objected to the liquidating plan which called for the liquidation of all of the
assets of the estate. Id. at 904. The court held that:
[a]ny objection based upon such a liquidation [was], however, without merit.
Although Chapter 11 is titled "Reorganization," Code Section 1123(b)(4) specifically
provides for the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a debtor and the distri-
bution of the proceeds among the creditors. The legislative history of this Section
leaves no doubt as to what was intended. The House Report to accompany the Code
("House Report") labeled a plan proposing the sale of the debtor's assets under Sec-
tion 1123(b)(4) a "liquidating plan." Clearly the term "reorganization," as used in
Chapter 11 of the Code, encompasses the systematic liquidation of a debtor.
Id. at 904 (citations omitted).
93. 45 Bankr. 473 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
94. Id at 475.
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plan." The property at issue in the relief action was a commercial prop-
erty site and building, virtually the sole property owned by the debtor.96
The period during which the debtor had to propose a plan had not yet
expired.97 The Sheppley court acknowledged that "an effective reorgani-
zation can include a liquidation."98 The court held that the property
held by the debtor was necessary for an effective reorganization and re-
fused to lift the stay because any plan that the debtor would ultimately
propose would require the use of the property. 99
Hence, under Sheppley, even the mere possibility that the debtor
may propose a liquidation under Chapter 11 is sufficient to defeat a credi-
tor relief action. The impact under Sheppley is startling in the degree to
which it protects the debtor's reorganization prospects from the destruc-
tiveness of creditor foreclosure."°° Under the Sheppley ruling, any sole
asset case filing under Chapter 11 will defeat a creditor relief action
under section 362. While this ruling may be limited to facts where the
debtor has not yet proposed a definite plan and where several alternative
plans appear viable to the court, a debtor holding a single asset may pro-
pose a reorganization plan and defeat a creditor's relief from stay action.
On the basis of two Code provisions, the turnkey sale of a debtor's
estate is possible, even where the debtor holds no equity in a given piece
of collateral and where the debtor does not intend to reorganize. The
liquidating plan provided in Chapter 11 and the conversion action by
parties in interest make the pursuit of the turnkey sale possible. Abstract
arguments based on "equity" and "property" are not necessary. The ar-
gument is in fact quite simple. As long as a liquidating plan calling for
the liquidation of some or all of the debtor's assets is recognized in the
95. Id at 478.
96. Id at 480.
97. Id at 478. Section 1121(b) provides the debtor with a 120 day period in which to file a
plan after seeking bankruptcy protection: "(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section,
only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under
this chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
98. Sheppley, 45 Bankr. at 479 (quoting In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469, 476 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1984)).
99. Id. at 477.
100. The Sheppley court declined to follow commentary in the legislative history of the
Code that "[i]n cases where the single asset of the debtor is real property, the court shall grant
relief from the stay if the debtor has no equity in the collateral, thereby allowing the creditor to
proceed with his foreclosure." Id. at 480 (quoting S. Ri. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 5787, 5791). If the legislative history
had been followed, relief from the stay would have been granted. The Sheppley court held that
relief would not be in compliance with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, "which is to favor
reorganization wherever realistically feasible." Id.
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reorganization chapter, then any significant asset of the debtor may be
deemed a necessary part of a turnkey liquidation plan.
III. CREDITOR RESPONSE TO THE CHAPTER 11 LIQUIDATION PLAN
A. Level 1: The Rehabilitation Test
If the debtor files under Chapter 11, or if a party in interest success-
fully converts a Chapter 7 proceeding into a proceeding under Chapter
11, the creditor will not obtain relief from the stay. The reason for this
result is that a showing will have been made that the debtor's property is
necessary for an effective reorganization. A creditor who is being denied
relief may argue that the liquidation plan under Chapter 11 should fail.
The creditor may argue that the property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization of the debtor under section 362(d)(2)(B). The creditor's
argument will be based on a split of opinion among courts as to the
meaning of section 362(d)(2)(B).
Some courts have read a "feasibility" or "likelihood of [successful]
rehabilitation" test into section 362(d)(2)(B). 1° ' The creditor seeking to
prevent a conversion to Chapter 11 will rely on this test. Other courts
have held that the proper test is a narrow "necessity test." 102 That test
simply requires that the property be necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion. Courts which follow this view will prohibit the creditor relief of the
stay at section 362, even when the debtor proposal is a liquidation
plan. 103
101. See In re Saypol, 31 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (debtor held no equity in
stock serving as security collateral and did not show that stock was necessary to effective
reorganization); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (auto-
matic stay lifted where debtor held no equity in property, and property was nonessential be-
cause no possibility of effective reorganization existed); In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (creditor not entitled to relief because property was necessary for effec-
tive reorganization); In re Mikole Dev., Inc., 14 Bankr. 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (debtor did
not have equity in property and the property was not necessary for effective reorganization
under rehabilitation test); In re Terra Mar Assoc., 3 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (auto-
matic stay lifted where debtor held no equity in property, and no successful reorganization
could have been effected within reasonable time); In re Dublin Properties, 12 Bankr. 77
(Bankr.-E.D. Pa. 1981) (reasonable likelihood test or reorganization applied to 362(d) hear-
ing); In re Greiman, 45 Bankr. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (debtor did not show reasonable
possibility of successful reorganization within reasonable time).
102. In re Independence Village, Inc., 52 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (effective
reorganization includes complete liquidation pursuant to Bankruptcy Code); In re Sunstone
Ridge Assoc., 51 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (test of whether property is necessary for
effective reorganization does not require determination of feasibility of successful reorganiza-
tion); In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (necessity of property for effective
reorganization does not require proof that rehabilitation plan can be confirmed).
103. The holding in In re Koopmans, 22 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), is therefore
supportive of the debtor defeating the creditor's action for relief of the automatic stay. The
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The issue to be resolved in this section is whether an effective reor-
ganization may encompass a liquidation plan under section 1123(b)(4) or
whether feasibility of successful reorganization is a requirement of the
test. Also, if the feasibility of a successful reorganization test is required,
does this test prevent a holding that a liquidation plan satisfies the re-
quirement? In other words, may the debtor argue that the property is
essential in making the liquidating plan feasible?
In re Koopmans 104 concerned a relief of stay action by a creditor
seeking to foreclose on real property held by the debtor who had filed for
Chapter 11 protection.105 The debtor was in the business of buying and
selling real estate. He owned fourteen homes which he had converted
into apartments for rental purposes.1 6 The creditor held a lien on one
of the homes.10 7 Having found that the debtor had no equity in the prop-
erty,108 the issue before the court was the meaning of section
362(d)(2)(B). The court had to determine whether it was required to
grant "relief from the stay when there [was] no prospect of rehab-
ilitation."'
10 9
The Koopmans court made independent arguments to support its
finding that "rehabilitation" should not be read into the necessity for
reorganization test of section 362(d). These arguments were based on the
plain language of the Code as analyzed in isolated elements, on analysis
of the language of the Code provisions construed in light of other sec-
tions or provisions of the Code l0 and also on a thorough analysis of the
statutory history"1 of section 362(d).
The Koopmans court first distinguished the meaning of a "reorgani-
Koopmans court held that when a Chapter 11 liquidation action is filed, the property may be
necessary to an effective reorganization. Id. at 407. Thus the test at section 362(d)(2)(B) is
satisfied.
104. 22 Bankr. 395.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Although the creditor held a lien for less than the value of the property, other liens
encumbering the property added to the creditor's lien resulted in a lack of equity in the debtor.
Id.
108. See supra note 107.
109. Koopmans, 22 Bankr. at 396. "Not every asset will be necessary for an effective reor-
ganization. The reference to an 'effective' reorganization should require relief from the stay if
there is no reasonable likelihood of reorganization due to creditor dissent or feasibility consid-
erations." Id.
110. The analysis was made by the court with reference to the conversion provisions of
section 1112(b); see infra text accompanying notes 151-54.
111. The Koopmans court provided the following analysis of the legislative history of sec-
tion 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code:
As proposed, Section 362(d) of H.R. 8200 and Section 362(d) of S. 2266 did not
contain a necessity test. The former permitted relief for cause including a lack of
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zation" from "rehabilitation." Reorganization "is concerned with
whether an asset may be instrumental in the continued operation or ulti-
mate sale of the business. The latter is concerned with whether the busi-
ness, viewed as a bundle of assets, liabilities, management, markets, and
the economy at large, can stay alive." '112 Whereas rehabilitation imposes
an expectation of vitality, reorganization does not.
The difference in meaning between these two concepts is important.
If reorganization did not include complete liquidation, then only a feasi-
ble rehabilitation could qualify as an effective reorganization for purposes
of the test at section 362(d)(2)(B). If it were not for the inclusion of
liquidation in the reorganization chapter of the Code, the only purpose
of reorganization would be rehabilitation. However, since section
adequate protection. The latter allowed relief where debtor had no equity in the
property.
The necessity test was the brainchild of insurance industry representatives who
testified at hearings on S. 2266. They believed "that the basic concept of Section
362(d) which authorizes the court to lift the automatic stay where the debtor has no
equity in the property is sound," but "in order to permit reorganization to go for-
ward where the property is essential to an ongoing business, an exception must be
provided for such situation." In their view, "[i]n the case of a piece of real property
... which is the security for a real estate mortgage and not part of a business that
should be reorganized for the benefit of all parties in interest, the stay should be
lifted." They argued that "whatever changes are made to Section 362(d) ... to
accommodate to corporate reorganizations [sic] not affect the real estate mortgage
transactions which warrants [sic] different treatment. This can be accomplished by
providing in Section 362(d) that relief from the automatic stay is limited to a situa-
tion where the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary
to an effective reorganization of the debtor, and that property shall be deemed not
necessary to the reorganization if it is real property on which no business is being con-
ducted by the debtor other than the business of operating the real property and activi-
ties incidental thereto."
These proposals, including guidelines explaining "necessary to an effective reor-
ganization," were added to Section 362(d) and were elucidated in the Senate Report:
Section 362(d) is intended "to reach the single-asset apartment type cases which in-
volve primarily tax-shelter investments and for which the bankruptcy laws have pro-
vided a too facile method to relay [sic] conditions, but not the operating shopping
center and hotel cases where attempts at reorganization should be permitted."
As enacted, Section 362(d)(2) dropped the guidelines explaining "necessary to
an effective reorganization," but floor leaders commented upon its purpose: Section
362(d)(2) "is intended to solve the problem of real property mortgage foreclosures of
property where the bankruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The section
is not intended to apply if the business of the debtor is managing or leasing real
property, such as a hotel operation, even though the debtor has no equity if the
property is necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor."
Section 362(d)(2)(B), by its terms and in light of its history, contains a necessity
not a rehabilitation test. Congress was concerned with the need for property, accord-
ing to the type of property and its relation to the business. If lenders were correct in
their conclusion that Chapter 11 is inappropriate for certain tax-sheltered, single-
asset real estate projects, "[t]his limitation on stays, by its very nature, would not
conflict with the goal of debtor rehabilitation."
22 Bankr. at 399-400 (footnotes and citations omitted).
112. Id at 397.
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1123(b)(4) explicitly provides for a liquidation plan as a plan of reorgan-
ization, then rehabilitation cannot be a requirement of reorganization.
The Koopmans opinion showed by comparison that rehabilitation
cannot be part of the test of section 362(d)(2)(B). The opinion stated
that "[i]f the [entire] business rather than [the secured collateral] were
the focus under sub-part (2)(B), then net worth of the business rather
than equity in the [secured collateral] might be considered under sub-
part (2)(A)." 3 According to the Koopmans analysis, since the determi-
nation of debtor equity is directed only to the equity held by the debtor in
the particular piece of property, not the equity held by the debtor in the
entire business of which the property is only a part," 4 the focus of reor-
ganization must be on the piece of property in relationship to the whole.
The secured collateral, therefore, does not take on the value of the entire
enterprise. Rather, the collateral is viewed as only one part of the whole,
and the value of that part is in the relationship or contribution of that
part to the whole. Thus under Koopmans, the focus is whether the rela-
tionship of the collateral to an organization is such that the collateral is a
necessary ingredient. If the relationship of the particular collateral to the
whole of the debtor's estate is such that no reorganization may be pur-
sued without it," 5 then this collateral is "necessary" to an effective
reorganization.1
16
According to the Koopmans court, the incorrect focus on the busi-
ness rather than the piece of property and its relationship to the business
resulted in improper application of a rehabilitation test. "[C]ourts which
apply the rehabilitation test ... look to the condition of the business
rather than the need for [the] asset, [and] will give relief from the stay
113. Id.
114. For example, consider that a given piece of secured collateral is a piece of real property
worth $100,000. On this property stands a factory building storing $500,000 worth of vintage
automobiles. The test of equity at section 362(d)(2) is directed only to the equity held by the
debtor in the property, that is, the value of the particular property-in this example, $100,000
minus the total of all encumbrances secured against that piece of property. The test of equity
is not the total value of the business-total assets of $600,000 minus total liabilities, minus the
encumbrances against the property.
115. This situation may exist when the collateral at issue is fungible raw material inventory
which could be easily replaced. Compare the above to a situation where the collateral is spe-
cialty equipment. Without this equipment, the business would need to restart rather than
reorganize.
116. The opinion cites the Bankruptcy Act, the body of bankruptcy law preceding the
Code, for support of its view. "Under the Act, relief from stay was possible, even where prop-
erty had equity, if there was no prospect of rehabilitation." Koopmans, 22 Bankr. at 397 n.5a.
The Code requires the satisfaction of both prongs before a creditor may have relief: as long as
the debtor has equity in the property or the property is necessary for an effective reorganiza-
tion, the creditor will be denied relief of the stay.
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where there is no prospect of rehabilitation, whether or not the asset is
necessary for an effective liquidation." '117 Section 1123(b)(4) of the Code
expressly provides that reorganization may be a liquidation.11 There-
fore, the rehabilitation test begs the question by requiring more of the
debtor's plan than does section 1123(b)(4). An effective reorganization
need not rehabilitate the debtor; it may instead call for the sale of "all or
some of the debtor's assets."1 19
An effective reorganization may require a given piece of collateral
even though the debtor holds no equity in it, especially where the collat-
eral is a primary asset, such as a major piece of manufacturing machin-
ery, without which the business has no viability. Even though
rehabilitation of the debtor's business may be impossible, if a turnkey
liquidation requires the property for an effective turnkey sale, then the
test at 362(d) is satisfied. 120 Thus, section 362(d)(2), when read in con-
junction with section 1123(b)(4), makes it unlikely that actual rehabilita-
tion of the debtor is a requirement of the relief test.
After deciding that section 362(d)(2) did not include a rehabilitation
test, the court in Koopmans fashioned its version of a necessity test. The
court looked for a "simple, workable test, which is faithful to the lan-
guage of Section 362(d)(2)(B), and which implements the policy of maxi-
mum value for creditors." 121 Accordingly, the court decided that the
appropriate test for determining whether property is necessary to an ef-
fective reorganization was whenever the property was "necessary, either
in the operation of the business or in a plan, to further the interests of the
estate through rehabilitation or liquidation."1 22 The examples the court
provided are supportive of the,turnkey sale presented as the focus of this
Comment:
The property may be important to the liquidation of other
property, as for example a warehouse or refrigerator which,
although over-encumbered, may be needed to store inventory
or groceries pending sale. The property standing alone may
have no equity, but when sold as a package, may bring a better
117. Id at 398. Additionally, "where Congress meant to employ a rehabilitation test, as in
11 U.S.C. Section 11 12(b)(1), it knew how to say so. The negative implication may be that no
similar meaning was attached to sub-part (2)(B)." Id.
118. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (1982). "[P]roperty may
be necessary either to an 'effective' rehabilitation or to an 'effective' liquidation." Koopmans,
22 Bankr. at 398.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4).
120. This model is identical to the hypothetical proposed at the outset of this Comment.
121. Koopmans, 22 Bankr. at 407.
122. Id (emphasis added).
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price for other assets, as for example, workings for watches yet
to be assembled, or contiguous parcels of real property.
1 23
Ultimately, the court held that the property at issue in the case was nec-
essary for an effective reorganization and maintained the stay, despite the
fact that the debtor had no equity in the property. 24
The opinion in Koopmans recognizes the value in preserving poten-
tial turnkey sale value. The turnkey value may be preserved by the
debtor filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. Alternatively,
interested parties may convert the Chapter 7 liquidation into a Chapter
11 turnkey liquidation plan. Under either alternative, if the liquidation
plan stipulates that the plan is to be a turnkey sale and identifies various
collateral essential for such a sale, the relief of the bankruptcy stay
should be denied.1
25
Many courts, however, have declined to follow Koopmans.26 These
courts have required a minimal showing of either the feasibility of a reor-
ganization or that the debtor can be rehabilitated, before denying a se-
cured creditor relief from the stay. These cases are reconcilable with
Koopmans.
The court in In re Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc. 27 distinguished
Koopmans. 2 Jug End concerned a hotel resort in southwest Massachu-
setts.' 29 The property was over-encumbered and the debtor held no eq-
uity in it. 3 ' The creditor sought relief of the automatic stay under
section 362(d)(2).' 3 ' With regard to the second prong of the relief test at
section 362(d), the Jug End court held that for the debtor to "meet that
burden, the debtor must do more than merely assert that the property is
123. Id.
124. Id. at 407, 408.
125. See also In re Independence Village, Inc., 52 Bankr. 715, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1985) ("We are persuaded by the reasoning of In re Koopmans ... and therefore hold that
even a plan of complete liquidation of the facility pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) may be
an effective reorganization for purposes of § 362(d)(2)(B)."); In re Sunstone Ridge Assoc., 51
Bankr. 560, 561-62 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) ('This court is convinced by the reasoning con-
tained in the case of In re Koopmans ... [R]eading a feasibility test from the words effective
reorganization is simply reading something that is not there."); In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469,
471 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (The term 'necessary for an effective reorganization' does not
require proof that a plan of rehabilitation can be confirmed. This conclusion is borne out by
the fact that an effective reorganization can include a liquidation.).
126. See supra note 101.
127. 46 Bankr. 892 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
128. Id. at 902.
129. Id. at 894.
130. IZL at 901. The court followed the majority view which "defines equity as the differ-
ence between the property value and the total amount of liens against it." Id.
131. Id. at 894.
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necessary to an effective reorganization."' 32 The Jug End court quoted
In re Clark Technical Associates, Ltd.:1
33
It is not enough for a debtor to argue that the automatic stay
should continue because it needs the secured property in order
to propose a reorganization. If this were the test all property
held by debtors could be regarded as necessary for the debtor's
reorganization. The keyword under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) is
"effective[.]"
If all the debtor can offer at this time is high hopes without any
financial prospects on the horizon to warrant a conclusion that
reorganization in the near future is likely, it cannot be said that
the property is necessary to an "effective" reorganization.
34
When the underlying policy of decisions like Clark Technical and
Jug End is made explicit, these cases are more easily reconciled with
Koopmans.135 The reason a minimal showing of rehabilitation is re-
quired is simply to protect creditors from frivolous claims of rehabilita-
tion made by debtors in an attempt to prevent creditor relief and
foreclosure. There must be some minimal and credible showing that the
property is important and that reorganization has more than a mere hope
of success.
This policy is sound because it recognizes the rights of creditors who
bargained for security interests. If frivolous claims of necessity and suc-
cessful reorganization defeat the creditor relief from stay actions, then
creditors will have to expect long delays in foreclosure on property be-
longing to debtors who file bankruptcy. Creditors will be encouraged to
foreclose prior to a debtor filing for the bankruptcy protection. 136 The
legislative history of section 362(d) indicates that one of the congres-
sional concerns and intentions in providing a relief from stay provision
was to protect the interests of real property lenders from the harshness of
132. Id. at 902.
133. 9 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
134. 46 Bankr. at 902 (quoting In re Clark Technical Assoc., Ltd., 9 Bankr. 738, 740
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981)).
135. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. The difference lies in determining
where the rehabilitation test should arise. Courts following Jug End require the showing of
rehabilitation at section 362(d). Cases following Koopmans require the minimal likelihood of
rehabilitation be shown at section 1112(b), the provision enabling conversion of a Chapter 11
action into a Chapter 7 action.
136. Because the Bankruptcy Code seeks to discourage creditors from stripping away assets
of the debtor during the period prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy protection, it is in
fact difficult for a creditor to foreclose on property during a "preference" period. That period
begins 90 days prior to the debtor's filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
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the stay where bankruptcy was filed on the eve of foreclosure. 137 Conse-
quently, creditors should not be denied relief from the stay unless the
reorganization plan has merit.
'However, the court in Jug End went further. First, the court de-
clined to follow the "liberal test in In re Koopmans which states that
'property in which the debtor has no equity is necessary to an effective
reorganization whenever it is necessary, either in the operation of the
business or in a plan, to further the interests of the estate through reha-
bilitation or liquidation.' ",131 Second, the court in Jug End did not hold
"reorganization" to encompass both rehabilitation and liquidation.
Rather, the court required that for the debtor to show that the property
was necessary to an effective reorganization, the debtor must show that
an effective reorganization was possible and that the property would con-
tribute to it.139 Although the policy behind the Jug End opinion may be
sound, the requirement the court imposed is not in the rule. A review of
the statute shows that the court is wrong. Section 362(d)(2)(B) expressly
requires only that the property is not necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion."4° Under section 1123(b)(4), reorganization encompasses liquida-
tion. Therefore, section 362(d)(2) does not, on its face, require
rehabilitation.
An alternative reading of Jug End may reconcile the court's opinion
with Koopmans. The Jug End court asks only for a demonstration by the
debtor of "a reasonable probability that [the debtor] will be able to pro-
pose a plan for a successful reorganization within a reasonable time. A
reasonable probability cannot be grounded solely on speculation, how-
ever, and a 'mere financial pipe dream' is insufficient .. 141 If the
question is whether a turnkey liquidation plan could satisfy such a test,
the answer ought to be "yes." Jug End does not require a showing of a
feasible rehabilitation, only a feasible reorganization. As long as the
debtor's turnkey liquidation plan is feasible, the test is satisfied. In this
way, the policy of Jug End and the rule of Koopmans are reconcilable.
Jug End sought to protect the creditor from frivolous claims of necessity
and reorganization. Koopmans sought to focus on the relationship of the
property to a reorganization. It is sufficient that there is a sound basis of
necessity and that the property is an integral part of a reorganization,
137. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
138. Jug End, 46 Bankr. at 902 (citing In re Koopmans, 22 Bankr. 395, 396-408 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982)).
139. Id. (citations omitted).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B).
141. Id. (citations omitted).
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whether the reorganization is a rehabilitation or a liquidation. A turnkey
liquidation plan, having a viable basis of success, would satisfy both
courts.
The court in In re Saypol 14 2 distinguished Koopmans and required
the debtor to show both that an effective reorganization was possible and
that the property would contribute to it.143 "The debtor need only prove
that there is a reasonable probability that it will be able to propose a plan
that will result in a successful reorganization within a reasonable
time." 144 The Saypol opinion followed the policy of Jug End in protect-
ing creditors from the burden of stays based on speculative reorganiza-
tion plans. 145
The opinion in Saypol is consistent with the opinion of the Koop-
mans court because the Saypol opinion recognized that the importance of
the property is not its inherent value, but the value of the property in
relation to the other property. The opinion in Koopmans made the same
argument, that the relationship is the important focus regardless whether
the plan calls for rehabilitation or liquidation. The important aspect to
consider is always the relationship of the property to the possibility of an
effective reorganization. In other words, is the property necessary to ac-
complish the goal?
In Saypol, a debtor sought to maintain a stay on a security agree-
ment consisting of stock in the bankrupt debtor's corporation. 146 The
debtor believed the stock would rise in value and would be worth more in
a future liquidation.1 47 The court held that there was no basis for
presuming the stock would rise in value and, in any case, the stock had
no relationship to the effectiveness of a reorganization or liquidation. 148
Consequently, the debtor made no showing of necessity. The court
stated:
The conceded lack of any rational basis for the premise that the
stock will increase in value [is] hardly proof that the stock is
necessary for an effective reorganization.
Moreover, the stock lacks any particular attribute contrib-
uting either to funding of a liquidation plan or to debtor rehabili-
tation. Certain assets by their income producing nature, by
142. 31 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
143. Id. at 803.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 797.
147. Id. at 798, 803.
148. Id. at 803.
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their relationship to other assets, by the benefits they contribute
to the debtor, or, as in the case of a factory, by their very es-
sence, can be recognized as essential to an effective plan.149
The Saypol, Koopmans and Jug End 5 0 opinions, viewed together,
present a simple test. Under 362(d)(2)(B), "necessary to an effective re-
organization" means that the property holds some attribute or character-
istic which in relation to the other property of the debtor makes the
whole more valuable. Reorganization is effective, either in the form of
rehabilitation or liquidation, if the plan is minimally feasible. The plan
cannot be pure speculation, fantasy, or the mere assertion of necessity on
the part of the debtor. The cases which follow the Jug End point of view
and read into section 362(d)(2) a feasibility test are reconcilable with
Koopmans because even if they do use a feasibility test, a liquidation plan
under section 1123(b)(4), which has a feasible chance of success, fulfills
the test. A turnkey sale of an enterprise that has genuine turnkey mar-
ketability satisfies the Jug End and Saypol test because these courts re-
quire only a feasible reorganization, not a feasible rehabilitation.
The tactic of filing for bankruptcy protection under a Chapter 11
liquidating plan is a successful method of preserving the value of a turn-
key sale. The policy in favor of granting relief where liquidation, rather
than rehabilitation, is intended is a valid consideration in determining the
feasibility of a turnkey sale, but not determinative. Consequently, credi-
tor expectations are not impaired by plans where the only intent is delay.
Plans which propose feasible turnkey liquidating plans should be upheld
under the above analysis.
B. Level 2: Creditor Conversion of the Chapter 11 Liquidation
to Chapter 7
This Comment has shown that a turnkey sale may be preserved and
creditor relief from the bankruptcy stay denied. This result is accom-
plished by filing the liquidation plan under section 1123(b)(4) of Chapter
11. If no rehabilitation test is read into section 362(d), which might
otherwise negate a showing of necessity for an effective reorganization,
the creditor may still seek relief from the stay. The creditor may seek
relief from the stay by attempting to convert the debtor's Chapter 11 plan
into a Chapter 7 liquidation. The creditor may base such an action on
section 1112(b) of the Code.' If the creditor is successful in converting
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See supra note 101 for similar case holdings.
151. Section 1112(b) provides: "on request of a party in interest,. . . the court may convert
a case under [Chapter 11] to a case under chapter 7... or may dismiss a case ... whichever is
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the plan from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, then the creditor may again
move for relief of the stay under section 362(d)(2)(B).
However, if the creditor is successful at converting the plan from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, the test of 362(2)(B) will be satisfied de jure.
The debtor will absolutely be within Chapter 7, not Chapter 11. Reorga-
nizations do not exist in Chapter 7, either rehabilitating or liquidating.
Therefore, if the debtor has no equity in the property, and if the creditor
is successful in converting the bankruptcy plan from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7, then the result under section 362(d)(2) will be relief from the
stay.
Under this analysis, the rehabilitation test that was read into section
362(d) by some courts re-emerges at section 1112(b). One of the factors
for the court to consider in the creditor's action to convert the plan from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 is whether the plan proposed by the debtor is
the "absence of a reasonable likelihood of a rehabilitation[.]" 52 How-
ever, important differences exist between a rehabilitation test at section
362(d) and a rehabilitation consideration at the conversion provision
under section 11 12(b)(1). First, the likelihood of rehabilitation consider-
ation is expressly provided by the Code at section 11 12(b)(1). This reha-
bilitation consideration is not provided for at section 362(d). Second, the
language of section 11 12(b)(1) provides that the court shall convert or
dismiss the case for cause, including the factors listed, "whichever is in
the best interest of creditors and the estate." '153 In In re Koopmans the
court stated:
Whether or not rehabilitation is "probable" or even "possible"
may be imponderable. How much "delay" and "prejudice" are
tolerable is a matter of degree. The "best interests" of creditors
and the estate, for better or for worse, must be measured by the
length of the chancellor's foot.... In short, the rehabilitation
test must be applied with discretion, not compulsion. It is ame-
nable to ultimate, complex issues such as dismissal, but not to
interim, abbreviated contests over the stay. It is workable given
the procedures of Section 11 12(b)(1), but not of Section
362(d)(2)(B).
154
in the best interest of creditors and the estate[.]" Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1112(b) (1982).
152. Id. at 1112(b)(1).
153. Id. at 1112(b).
154. Koopmans, 22 Bankr. at 401. See also In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469, 471 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1984) (imposition of a rehabilitation test on section 362(d)(2)(B) would make meaning-
less the provisions of section 11 12(b)(1)).
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The likelihood of a creditor succeeding with a conversion action at
section 1112(b) under the conditions where significant turnkey sale value
is lost would seem to be extremely low. It would be very unlikely for a
bankruptcy court to convert a feasible turnkey liquidation plan under
Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 liquidation. That conversion from Chapter 11
to Chapter 7 would destroy the possibility of substantial increase in reve-
nue generation for the benefit of all creditors. A Chapter 7 liquidation
would enable the creditor to obtain relief from the bankruptcy stay and
foreclose on the property.
The use of this tactic by the debtor-filing for bankruptcy protec-
tion under Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7-should be successful. The
liquidation provision of section 1123(b)(4) allows him to propose a feasi-
ble turnkey liquidation. The policy of protecting all creditors is served
by preserving turnkey sale value. Where the debtor makes a valid show-
ing that a turnkey sale is feasible, the test imposed under section
362(d)(2) is met. Further, the likelihood of a secured creditor success-
fully converting the Chapter 11 liquidating plan to a Chapter 7 plan, only
for the purpose of gaining relief from the automatic stay, will be ex-
tremely low, especially when relief of the stay results in the loss of
demonstrated turnkey value. The benefits of the turnkey sale outweigh
the benefits to the foreclosing creditor. The benefits will outweigh the
detriment especially where the foreclosing creditor can be compensated
for a delay in granting relief from the stay.
IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CODE SECTION 362(d)(2)
The beneficial value of a turnkey sale would be protected from a
relief of stay action if the Code were amended as follows:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided
under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, an-
nulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property
under subsection (a) of this section, if-
(A) the debtor has no equity in the property, and
(B) the property is not necessary to an effective reor-
ganization, where such reorganization has prima facie feasibility
as either a rehabilitation or liquidation plan.
The amendment addresses the concerns expressed in cases such as
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:893
Jug En15 and Saypol,'5 6 namely, protecting creditors from frivolous
plans filed by debtors which only delay foreclosure on security. The
amendment would also protect the interests of junior secured and un-
secured creditors by identifying and recognizing the value of property in
the context of liquidation. The potential value of a turnkey sale should
and would be protected, as long as the turnkey liquidation has prima
facie viability.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has established that a creditor's ability to obtain re-
lief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy may be delayed or condi-
tioned so that a turnkey liquidation may be pursued. The means of
accomplishing this result is a tactical maneuver by a debtor or any party
in interest. The tactic requires only that a turnkey liquidation plan be
proposed under Chapter 11. If the plan stipulates that the plan is in-
tended as a turnkey liquidation, and describes how the turnkey sale is
feasible, then the plan will have a strong likelihood of approval by the
bankruptcy court. Approval of the plan will especially be likely where
the plan describes the difference in total revenue that may be obtained if
the property is successfully sold under a turnkey sale rather than under
piecemeal sale. Under such a plan, a secured creditor will be denied re-
lief where the debtor's plan identifies the creditor's collateral as being
necessary to an effective turnkey liquidation.
The remaining issue to be considered is whether preventing or de-
laying relief of the automatic stay is a good result. Secured creditor ex-
pectations are damaged to the extent that a secured creditor would have
expected relief from the stay. If secured creditors are not able to rely on
their expectation of relief from the stay, at least where the debtor has no
equity in the collateral and where the debtor is not reorganizing, then
denying these creditors relief may have a detrimental effect on the availa-
bility of credit. Secured creditors will likely adjust their lending practices
to compensate for the potential, and perhaps likely, delay in obtaining
relief from the stay.
However, clear benefits of preserving the turnkey sale value exist to
both secured and unsecured creditors. Clearly the whole point of the
turnkey sale and the maximization of revenue is to benefit junior and
unsecured creditors, who benefit from the generation of additional reve-
nue. The debtor himself may even benefit if there is revenue remaining
155. In re Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc., 46 Bankr. 892 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
156. In re Saypol, 31 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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after payment of all claims. These benefits should outweigh the harm to
the secured creditor who seeks relief of the stay, especially if the secured
creditor is provided with compensation for the delay and as long as the
delay is not an unreasonable period in length. Ideally, such a secured
creditor would agree that the benefits outweigh the detriment to him and
indeed admit that, were he one of the junior or unsecured creditors, he
would advocate the same result.
David W Meadows*
* The author would like to thank Professor Dan Schechter for his helpful insight and
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